Why isn't a prompt filter enough?
A filter acts on language, not on effect. It sees neither the agent's code and dependencies, nor the tools it calls, the APIs it reaches, or the processes and network flows it generates. A malicious instruction can arrive through an indexed document, a tool result or contaminated memory, then produce a real action that only a control close to the runtime can interrupt.
How do you discover undeclared agents and tools?
By combining several sources: traffic to model providers, API calls, running workloads, code repositories, MCP manifests and configuration. These signals are correlated to build an inventory, identify owners and surface Shadow AI, including usage started outside the usual project framework.
How do you secure MCP servers?
By inventorying servers and their tools, verifying owner, version and provenance, then restricting which tools each agent can see. Schemas and parameters are controlled, destinations and amounts constrained, sensitive actions simulated or sent for human approval, and results filtered before they return to the agent.
How do you protect RAG and memory?
By controlling what enters indexes and memory, detecting instructions hidden inside documents, partitioning retrieval per tenant or per record, masking sensitive data, and making it possible to freeze or restore a contaminated memory.
Why protect the runtime?
Because that is where the real effect happens: a process started, a file read or written, an outbound flow. It is the last place a dangerous action can still be stopped, and the only one that proves a fix actually changed the observed behaviour.
Can we start in observation mode?
Yes, and that is the recommended starting point. Discovery and observation build a baseline, policies are tested in simulation, and blocking is enabled only where the action is sensitive or irreversible.
How do you detect a compromised or hijacked agent?
Through cross-layer correlation: an unusual instruction, an unexpected tool chain, abnormal volume or cost, access to out-of-scope data, a never-seen process or egress. Detection targets the sequence, not an isolated event.
How do you isolate or revoke an agent?
By cutting whatever produces the effect: revoking secrets and tokens, removing tools, blocking network destinations, switching to read-only, isolating or stopping the workload, freezing memory. These actions are prepared in runbooks so they can be executed without improvisation.
How do alerts integrate with an existing SOC?
Detections, timelines and evidence are exported to your SIEM and SOAR tooling, with tickets and runbooks attached. The goal is to use your existing handling processes rather than adding one more console.
How does this offer relate to IAM and fine-grained authorization?
Fine-grained authorization answers the permission question: is this action legitimate in this context. This offer answers the effect question: what the agent actually does, with which tools and data, whether its environment is sound, and how to interrupt then explain an incident. The two complement each other and both build on your IAM, PAM and Access Management foundations.