Use case — Complying with DORA
DORA and Axiomatics: applying least privilege at the moment of the action
DORA does not stop at the question of whether a person holds an access right or not. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 requires in particular that rights be granted according to the need-to-know, need-to-use and least privilege principles. It also requires access restrictions to support the protection requirements associated with the classification of data and systems, and controls to effectively prevent unauthorised access.
These requirements may exceed what a static role model can simply express. An IGA platform can determine that a person is legitimate to perform a function and grant them the corresponding roles. Axiomatics comes in at another moment: when the application has to decide whether that identity may perform a precise action on a precise resource, in the present context. This is the role we assign to fine-grained authorization in our IAM architecture: IAG governs identities and rights, while Axiomatics makes the authorization decision at the moment the action is executed.
Actually applying least privilege: DORA Article 21(a)
DORA requirement
Article 21(a) — Least privilege
- Need-to-know
- Need-to-use
- Least privilege
Axiomatics
- Contextual decision at runtime
- Subject + Action + Resource + Environment
- ABAC / PBAC
Article 21(a) requires that access to ICT assets rest on the need-to-know, need-to-use and least privilege principles, including for remote and emergency access. An RBAC model can answer part of this requirement by giving a person the rights associated with their role, but it reaches its limits when the decision depends simultaneously on several characteristics of the user, the resource and the requested action.
Take the case of Claire, a Senior Analyst in the Finance France department. Her IGA may legitimately grant her the “Finance Analyst” role, but that role alone cannot decide whether Claire should be able to view every financial file, modify certain information or perform an operation involving another entity of the group.
Axiomatics makes it possible to build a decision from attributes belonging to four categories: the subject, the action, the resource and the environment. The vendor's documentation mentions, for example, for the subject, the role, the department or the clearance level; for the action, viewing or modifying; for the resource, the file or object concerned; and for the environment, elements such as location, time or device type. These attributes are evaluated dynamically at the time of the request.
In our example, the policy could therefore take into account the fact that Claire belongs to Finance France, requests to view file FIN-2026-00452, that this file belongs to the France entity and carries a given classification. The role remains useful information, but it becomes one of the elements of the decision rather than the whole policy.
This approach also avoids creating a new role for every possible combination of function, entity, data type or action. Axiomatics presents PBAC precisely as an alternative to overly static authorization models: policies are centralised and use attributes to adapt authorizations without having to change the entire role model or code each rule directly into applications.
Enforcing data classification: DORA Article 11(a)
DORA requirement
Article 11(2)(a) — Access restrictions must support the protection requirements corresponding to the classification levels
Axiomatics
- Resource classification attributes
- Subject clearance attributes
- Policy evaluated at runtime
Article 11 of the delegated regulation requires the security of data and systems to be organised in accordance with the classification established under DORA. Its point 2(a) requires more precisely that the access restrictions provided for in Article 21 support the protection requirements corresponding to each classification level.
Axiomatics is not mandated by DORA, and the regulation prescribes neither ABAC nor PBAC. A dynamic authorization engine does, however, provide a direct technical means of bringing this classification into the access decision. The Axiomatics documentation explicitly illustrates policies comparing subject clearance level attributes with the classification of the resource.
For Claire, this means that access to the Finance application is not automatically an authorization to view all the information it contains. A rule can allow access to the file if its entity matches Claire's and if the classification of the file is compatible with her clearance level. Another rule can impose additional conditions for a modification or an export.
The control then applies to the object actually consumed and to the action actually requested. This distinction between rights governance and fine-grained authorization is also the one used in our IAM architecture: fine-grained authorization complements IAG when rights can no longer be determined in advance alone.
Technically preventing unauthorised access: DORA Article 21(d)
DORA requirement
Article 21(d) — Controls and tools preventing unauthorised access
Axiomatics
- PAP — policy administration
- PIP — attribute provisioning
- PDP — decision
- PEP — enforcement of the decision
Article 21(d) requires access restrictions on ICT assets to include controls and tools to prevent unauthorised access. For Axiomatics, this requirement translates into an architecture in which the policy and the decision are separated from the application that enforces the result.
Axiomatics relies in particular on the XACML model. When a request arrives, a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) intercepts it and passes the necessary information to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP evaluates the policies and the available attributes, then returns a decision, typically Permit or Deny. The PEP then enforces that decision on the protected resource. Policies are administered through a Policy Administration Point (PAP) and the information needed to evaluate them may come from Policy Information Points (PIP) such as a directory, a database or another reference source.
For Claire, the application therefore does not need to contain a series of conditions such as “if Finance France, if classification X, if action Y, then allow”. It asks the authorization engine whether Claire may view FIN-2026-00452. The PDP evaluates the policy with the necessary attributes and returns its decision to the PEP.
Above all, this externalisation makes it possible to apply the same authorization policy at several points of the information system. Axiomatics documents this for applications, microservices and API Gateways; in the latter case, the gateway can act directly as the PEP while Axiomatics remains the PDP.
Centralising the policy without freezing it into applications
Centralising the policy brings a second benefit in a regulatory context: a change to the rule does not necessarily require a change to the code of every application that enforces it.
Axiomatics describes PBAC as an approach in which authorization policies are externalised and managed separately from applications. Rules can therefore be updated or revoked without reimplementing permissions in each application's code, while keeping a common point of policy governance.
This capability becomes useful when several applications consume the same business or regulatory rule. A change concerning the classification of a piece of data, the access conditions of a population or an operation limit can be carried by the policy and then enforced by the various PEPs concerned. It does not remove the need for a sound identity model or for quality data: dynamic authorization remains dependent on the reliability of the attributes used to make the decision.
Keeping evidence of the decision: DORA Article 12
DORA requirement
Article 12 — Logging of events related in particular to logical access control and identity management
Axiomatics
- Trace of authorization decisions
- Permit / Deny
- Runtime audit of decisions and policies
DORA also requires events relating to logical access control and identity management to be logged. Article 12 requires the level of detail of logs to be appropriate to their purpose and to allow, in particular, the detection of anomalous activities.
Axiomatics can contribute to this chain of evidence by logging authorization decisions. The vendor distinguishes in particular between the administrative audit of policies and the authorization logs produced at runtime, which make it possible to follow the decisions taken during access requests.
In our example, the point is therefore not only to know that Claire attempted to view a file. It also becomes possible to keep the authorization decision taken at that moment and to link it to the policy used.
This trace does not, however, replace the complete logging framework required by DORA. Article 12 also covers ICT system activities, change management, network traffic and other events. Axiomatics provides evidence of its authorization decision; the other logging and security building blocks remain necessary to reconstruct the overall activity of the system.
Where Axiomatics fits into the DORA architecture
Axiomatics replaces neither IGA nor Access Management. These building blocks answer different questions. IGA determines and governs the rights an identity should hold over time; Access Management verifies the identity and the access conditions; Axiomatics comes in when the authorization must be recomputed at the moment of the action according to the resource and the context.
For Claire, the chain is therefore simple to read: her IGA establishes that she is a Senior Analyst in Finance, her authentication system verifies that she is indeed the expected person, then Axiomatics decides whether she may perform the requested action on the file concerned. If the decision is positive, the PEP lets the request through; if one of the conditions provided for by the policy is no longer satisfied, access is denied without needing to create a new role to represent that situation.
It is this capability that makes fine-grained authorization particularly interesting in a DORA approach. It does not constitute “Axiomatics compliance with DORA”, but a way of translating certain requirements of least privilege, classification and prevention of unauthorised access into authorization decisions executed and traceable at runtime.
Claire
Senior Analyst — Finance France
Application / API
“Can Claire view FIN-2026-00452?”
PEP
Policy Enforcement Point
Intercepts the request
PDP — Axiomatics
Policy Decision Point
The PDP evaluates
Subject
- job function: Senior Analyst
- department: Finance
- country: France
Action
- view
Resource
- FIN-2026-00452
- entity: France
- classification: Confidential
Environment
- only the contextual attributes actually available in the architecture
Decision
The decision depends on the policy that is evaluated.
PEP
enforces the decision
Sources
Regulatory texts — EUR-Lex
Going further
Complying with DORA: which controls?
The master page: mapping DORA controls onto identities, access, privileges and data.
Netwrix Identity Manager
The other product sub-page of the DORA use case: identity governance and access certification.
Fine-grained authorization
The Ariovis service: authorization model, policies, PDP and connection of applications and APIs.
Axiomatics
Our authorization partner: ABAC, PBAC and externalised decision-making.
ReBAC or PBAC: which authorization model?
The expert insight on choosing an authorization model according to the use cases.
PBAC
The definition of policy-based access control in the IAM glossary.
Discuss your DORA authorization controls
Ariovis supports the design of authorization models, the integration of policies and the connection of the applications, APIs and attribute sources needed for a fine-grained, contextual decision.